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Creator:: Munro, Gordon, Sumaila, U. Rashid, and Turris, Bruce
Abstract:: This paper puts forth the proposition that all catch share schemes should be analysed primarily through the lens of cooperative game theory, which has now been developed to an advanced degree in the analysis of international fisheries management. If the fishers in a catch share scheme are playing cooperatively, the...
Resource Type:: Research Paper
Full Text:: RESEARCH AGENDA Gordon Munro*, U. Rashid Sumaila** and Bruce Turris*** *Professor Emeritus, Department

Creator:: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract:: This alphabetical listing of authors was linked to the papers on the original CD version of the proceedings.
Resource Type:: Conference Proceeding
Full Text:: , Presentation 2, Presentation 3, Presentation 4) Blonigen, Bruce Boatto, Vasco Boggess, Carolyn Boncoeur, Jean

Creator:: The International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade and Keenan, Kara
Resource Type:: Other
Full Text:: , Kampala, Uganda Kampala 256 Uganda Email: gert_kunda@yahoo.com Colin Barnes Cambridge Resource

Creator:: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract:: The table of contents is arranged alphabetically by session title. All authors and paper titles are listed.
Resource Type:: Conference Proceeding
Full Text:: . Bruce Rettig Shepard Buchanan: Power, Fish, and the Greenhouse on the Columbia River Emery N

Creator:: Clay, Patricia M., Pinto da Silva, Patricia, and Kitts, Andrew
Abstract:: Catch share systems are being encouraged and considered in a variety of United States (U.S.) fisheries. Scientists, policy makers, and stakeholders (including fishermen and non-governmental environmental organizations) have different views about potential social and economic impacts and outcomes of these output- oriented systems. Thus identifying and evaluating impacts over time...
Resource Type:: Research Paper
Full Text:: and Madeleine Hall- Arber (Guest Editors), Human Ecology Review, 15(2), pp. 143-160. Clark, Colin W

Creator:: Poole, Erik
Abstract:: Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal...
Resource Type:: Conference Proceeding
Full Text:: Fisheries, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31, 352-367, 1996. Clark, Colin W

Creator:: Holland, Daniel S.
Abstract:: Although widely accepted, management systems that directly restrict catch or effort are neither efficient nor desirable for many fisheries, and have failed to conserve fishery stocks in many cases. Fisheries scientists have suggested that closing part of the fishery with marine reserves may sustain or increase harvest. These marine reserves...
Resource Type:: Research Paper
Full Text:: . Clark, Colin. 1991. "Economic Biases against Sustainable Development." in Ecological Economics: the

Creator:: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract:: IIFET 2006 Portsmouth Conference Participants List
Resource Type:: Other
Full Text:: Juneau AK 99811-5526 USA E-mail: rachel_baker@fishgame.state.ak.us IIFET Member Dr. Colin Barnes

Creator:: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract:: Participants are listed alphabetically. Additional authors may appear on individual papers.
Resource Type:: Conference Proceeding
Full Text:: Helleveien 30 Bergen Sandviken N-5035 Norway Email: Trond.Bjorndal@nhh.no Bruce Blonigen University

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