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Policy-induced Market Failure Under the American Fisheries Act Public Deposited

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Abstract
  • This paper explores the political economy of using fishery cooperatives to advance voluntary decapitalization and rationalization that the U. S. Congress intended to benefit both vessels and processors. Game theory offers insights into the likelihood of achieving congressional intent. It is argued that the American Fisheries Act introduces a potential new market failure while attempting to rid the fishery of the open access externality.
  • Key words: voluntary fishery cooperatives, rationalization, non-cooperative game, market failure
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  • Matulich, S.C., F. Inaba and M. Sever. Policy-induced Market Failure Under the American Fisheries Act. In: Microbehavior and Macroresults: Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA. Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.
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Conference Location
  • Corvallis, Oregon, USA
Proceedings Editors
  • Johnston, Richard S.
  • Shriver, Ann L.
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  • International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade; U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service; MG Kailis Group
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