Abstract:
The objective of the paper is to analyse and to simulate fishers dis-investment behaviour especially in the context
of the French buyback policy. A case study, the limited entry scallop fishery of the Saint-Brieuc bay is used to consider the
problem of excess capacity and to review the impact of the national decommissioning schemes on the scallop fleet. The role
of financial incentives technical and economic are studied to explain individual decisions to stay or to leave the fishery.
Considering these lessons, the second part of the paper aims at modelling fishers’ behaviour in order to simulate the bioeconomic
impacts of buyback programs and the role of different incentive schemes. Special attention is paid to the assessment
of willingness to accept to leave the fishery. The model is applied to the scallop fishery while highlighting agency problems
such as the role of the regulator’s information about fleet and cost structure. The problem of windfall gains problem due to the
mis-specification of the buy-back programs is analysed. Spreadsheet simulations lead to cost-benefit analysis of different
policy options.
