Abstract:
This paper puts forth the proposition that all catch share schemes should be analysed primarily
through the lens of cooperative game theory, which has now been developed to an advanced degree in the
analysis of international fisheries management. If the fishers in a catch share scheme are playing
cooperatively, the resource managers are at the same time to be seen as playing a leader-follower game
with the fishers. While the proposition obviously applies to all catch share schemes, the focus of the paper
will be on ITQ schemes. The basic rudiments of the required theory are to be found in a 2006 article by
Lone Krønbak and Marko Lindroos, and carry with it the spirit of Elinor Ostrom. We will argue that
much more needs to be done.
We shall maintain that, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game, the various
residual inefficiencies of ITQ schemes discussed in many articles should vanish. Needless to say, if a
given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game the distinction between it and other catch right
schemes will blur. We shall also argue that, if ITQ schemes succeed as stable cooperative games, this will
enable the fishers to bargain constructively with other stakeholders. Examples will be drawn, inter alia,
from the evolving harvesting rights schemes off Canada’s Pacific coast.
