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Sub-Perfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees Public Deposited

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https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/articles/7w62f8811

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  • This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association (NBA) referees. Using a sample of 28,388 quarter-level observations from six seasons, we find that referees make calls that favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase league revenues. In order to distinguish between referee and player behavior we use play-by-play data, which allow us to analyze turnovers referees have relatively high and low discretion over separately.
  • Keywords: Rule Compliance, National Basketball Association (NBA), Persuasion, Forensic Economics, Social Pressure, Home Bias
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  • Price, J., Remer, M. and Stone, D. F. (2012), Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 21: 271–300. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00325.x
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  • 21
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  • 1
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