Conference Proceedings Or Journal

 

Optimal Liability Rules: The Case of Renewable Resources Public Deposited

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/zw12z975w

Descriptions

Attribute NameValues
Creator
Abstract
  • Illegal extraction is a serious issue in many renewable resource industries, such as fisheries and forestry. This traditional approach is to model the resource firm as one cohesive unit or an individual. However, in many cases violations are not committed by an individual, but by agents acting on behalf of an owner or a firm. We ask what the optimal liability scheme is when the illegal extraction activity is carried out by employees representing a firm, rather than by an individual, when the employees can engage in avoidance activities to reduce the risk of detection when extracting illegally (Kornhauser, 1982). We develop a principal-agent model with imperfect information and analyze who should be held liable and punished: the employees, the firm/owner, or perhaps both parties? We find the optimal policy, which involves determining liability rules in conjunction with quotas and punishment levels. The renewable resource case is particularly interesting because it is the firm, and not the agent, that benefits directly from illegal operations. This is in contrast to most of the existing literature on corporate crime and liability, which assumes that only the agent benefits directly from illegal activities. We show how this affects the optimal liability rules.
  • Keywords: Compliance, Enforcement, and the Lack Thereof Part II, Fisheries Management, Fisheries Economics
  • Keywords: Compliance, Enforcement, and the Lack Thereof Part II, Fisheries Management, Fisheries Economics
Resource Type
Date Available
Date Issued
Citation
  • Hansen, L., Nostbakken, L. & Jensen, F. Optimal Liability Rules: The Case of Renewable Resources: Visible Possibilities: The Economics of Sustainable Fisheries, Aquaculture and Seafood Trade: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 16-20, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Edited by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2012.
Conference Name
Subject
Rights Statement
Funding Statement (additional comments about funding)
  • AQUAFISH, USAID, NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, Norad, The World Bank, Hyatt Regency Dar es Salaam, NAAFE, World Wildlife Fund, United Nations University Fisheries Training Programme, ICEIDA, JICA, JIFRS, The European Association of Fisheries Economists, International Seafood Sustainability Foundation
Publisher
Peer Reviewed
Language
Replaces

Relationships

Parents:

This work has no parents.

In Collection:

Items