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Putting a Dollar Value on Whaling: Can Bargaining Break Deadlock in Whaling Conflict? Public Deposited

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https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/kh04dr55c

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  • An international conflict between pro- and anti-whaling countries has been a concern. While many Western countries condemn whaling, Japan conducts ‘research whaling’ under the special permission of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) along with Norway and Iceland, who also engage in commercial whaling. Especially Japan and Australia have been divided over whaling for many years, which brought them to the dispute at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yet, Japan still whales and the discontent among Australian is growing. In economic theory, this is inefficiency resulting from lack of property rights; there is no owner of whales who can decide whether to catch or protect in the most efficient manner. In this study, we examine an economic way of solving this conflict on whaling. In particular, we reply on the Coase theorem and consider monetary compensation as an alternative way. The study hypothesizes that Australians’ willingness to pay (WTP) to prohibit Japan from whaling is greater that Japanese’ willingness to accept (WTA) to abandon whaling, and if so, it can be Pareto-improving that Australia pays Japan to stop whaling. We conducted an international survey to measure WTP and WTA of the two countries using double bounded dichotomous choice and a payment card. Australians were asked about their WTP to ban Japan from catching any great whales as well as catching Antarctic Minke Whales only, which is the only whale species in Antarctic that Japan hunts. Counterpart WTAs were asked in Japan.
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  • Aberdeen, Scotland, UK
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Peer Reviewed
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  • 0976343290

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