At a 1969 conference, Coase provided rather scathing comment on a paper co-authored by Scott (Economics of Fisheries Management: A Symposium, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1970.) That comment is remarkable inasmuch as Scott thought that he was using a transactions cost approach based upon Coase (1960). This paper will...
In the administration of its quota management system (QMS), New Zealand sets a “deemed value” fee that must be paid for any landings in excess of annual catch entitlements (ACE.) The deemed value system is an example of a price-capped cap-and-trade system (Roberts and Spence 1976). This paper argues that...
In 2001, New Zealand modified its quota management system (QMS) to function as a hybrid ITQ/tax system. Catches in excess of annual catch entitlements (ACE) incur payments, called “deemed values”. The deemed value
system was part of the reforms that separated ACE from quota, which reduced transactions costs for both...
In several countries, cost recovery and/or rent collection (CRRC) has become integral to fishery management. This paper will examine CRRC from three perspectives: neo-classical economic efficiency, equity, and public choice. Partial equilibrium economic efficiency arguments include incentives for industry to implement (or lobby for) efficient delivery of management services. On...