An ITQ scheme has been shown to create a quota induced incentive for discarding of fish in excess of what is socially optimal. This finding is corroborated by empirical evidence in several ITQ managed fisheries. The incentive for discarding, over and above those expected in an unmanaged or input controlled...
Fisheries economists and fishery scientists have forcefully argued that access to fisheries has to be restricted so as to increase stock size, harvest and/or profitability compared to what would be the results of free access. Fisheries economists have pointed out that management by Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs for short) fare...
A serious impediment blocks advancement of individual transferable quota (ITQ) policy in the United States, particularly in North Pacific fisheries being considered for ITQ management. The traditional ITQ design, that allocates rights to only the harvesting sector, unintentionally expropriates wealth/property interests from the co-dependent-processing sector. This regulatory expropriation is a...
The current Senate Bill to reauthorize the Magnuson/Stevens Act, the key US fishery management law,
will allow some significant changes in the way that Individual Transferable Quota programs can be
developed. First, the bill will expand the range of individuals who will be permitted to obtain harvesting
privileges. In addition...
Fisheries worldwide continue to suffer from the negative consequences of open access. In 1986, New Zealand responded by establishing an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that by 1998 included 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas. We assess these markets in terms of trends in market activity,...
Management of individual species in a multi-species fishery poses a number of challenges for fishery management systems, including the problem of managing fish bycatch. Fish bycatch is sometimes identified as a particular problem associated with management systems based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) but this has not always proven to...
This paper analyzes the behavior of fishing households under individual transferable quotas (ITQ) system based on Singh, Squire and Strauss household model. ITQ system is sought to be the optimal fishery management regime in terms of economic efficiency. However, preceding theoretical analyses only considered implementing ITQ to a well established...
Four commercial fisheries off Alaska’s coast are managed by transferable quota systems. Implementation
of each quota program was controversial, and two programs were mandated by federal legislation rather
than standard rulemaking procedure. Pacific halibut and sablefish are managed by individual harvest
quota programs, which were designed to maintain a predominantly...
As a Member State of the European Community (EC), the United Kingdom's marine capture fisheries must be managed within the framework of the Community's common fisheries policy (see Box 1). Since 1983 this has included a system of annual total allowable catches (TACs) for most commercially important stocks within the...
Resource management under Individual Transferable Quota System (ITQ’s) is similar to that of Total Allowable Catch system. It, however, is said that the former is more difficult than the latter. In this paper, by analysing the case of the New Zealand’s ITQ’s during Fiscal Year 1991 and 2001, the current...