Many commercial fisheries around the world experience spatial
coexistence of species and imperfectly selective harvesting gears. This
makes these fisheries multi-product industries, that often harvest multispecies
or have a bycatch of another (maybe also valuable) species, which
may or may not be target species for another fishery. Traditional game
theoretic...
Many international fisheries agreements involve sharing rules. These rules are normally stable rules, not contingent on shifts in the relative distribution or development of the resource. In the latest IPCC report,
the most likely future scenario is an increase in the global mean temperature, and most severely in high
latitudes....
The paper argues that Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) can be a suitable
evaluation tool in cases where some of the benefits are difficult to measure
(e.g. habitat protection) and where the tangible benefits are lower than the
cost. An example is polities aiming at protecting a single species in
multispecies fisheries....
The lack of selectivity in many fisheries may lead to discards and bycatch. Discards of under-sized or non-commercial species/individuals represent damage to the eco-system, an additional source of overfishing and a waste of resources. Bycatch may increase fishing pressure on species targeted by other fishermen. The purpose of the paper...
In most decision making involving natural resources, the achievements of the policy (e.g., better ecosystem) are rather difficult to measure in monetary units. To overcome this problem the paper develops a modified Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) to include these intangible benefits in intertemporal natural resource problems. The proposed CEA framework is...
The paper focuses on the combination of the cooperative fisheries management with the non-cooperative literature. It has important modeling contributions by creating a new framework on co-management. The structure of the model is repeated coalition game with the possibility to deviate combined with introduction of a variation of a club...
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values...
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marita.laukkanen@vatt.fi
Grønbæk, Lone
Department of Business and Economics
University of Southern
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values...
Full Text:
Economic Research, Finland
LoneGrønbæk, University of Southern Denmark
Marko Lindroos, University of
The purpose of this paper is not to present new game theoretic results, but is rather to discuss a new and much needed research program, which is at an early stage. Progress to date will be reported upon. It is the contention of the authors that, in stark contrast to...
This document provides a summary of a Special Session presentation held at the IIFET 2016 Scotland conference in July 2016. The registration number and title of the session were 5024: Game Theory and Fisheries. The session was organized by Marko Lindroos. The report includes details of the proceedings of the...