ITQ systems generate ITQ prices. For any given ITQ-managed species there are typically two prices. One is for the annual (or seasonal) quota, the other is for the longer lasting ITQ-share. In well-functioning ITQ markets, these prices reveal important information about the fishery. In the single species framework, prices of...
During the first three years (2007-2009) of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program most quota lease trades were local, involving fishers that lived in the same communities. In 2010, the red snapper quota lease market changed as more IFQ participants began trading quota with fishers from different regions...
"Rationalization” or the change to catch share management in fisheries has been shown to lead to the slowing of fishing activity, input and effort consolidation, cost savings, as well as new market and product development. The effects of rationalization on fishermen’s behavior become more complex when one accounts for the...
In 2011 an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system was implemented for the limited entry trawl component of the Pacific groundfish fishery in the US. The IFQ system allocates quota shares (QS) for 29 IFQ stocks and individual bycatch quota (IBQ) shares for Pacific halibut. Each year quota shareholders are issued...
Many of the tangible benefits of catch share programs (e.g., reducing overcapacity) are dependent on the trading of shares. Additional trading-related questions (such as whether landings will change port or be concentrated geographically) are also important to the overall evaluation of a fishery, but are often asked only during post-implementation...
Multispecies fisheries pose a considerable management difficulty with respect to quota allocation between species. The applicability is to single vessel and its individual quotas, as well as to the fleet as a whole. Negative externalities may be created if Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are not set in optimal proportions. That...
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Business Economics
University of Southern Denmark
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Management and Economics of
Resources and the
Multispecies fisheries pose a considerable management difficulty with respect to quota allocation between species. The applicability is to single vessel and its individual quotas, as well as to the fleet as a whole. Negative externalities may be created if Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are not set in optimal proportions. That...
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Management of Fisheries: What Role can Economics Play
Optimal Quota Allocation in Multispecies