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Issues in monitoring fisheries management performance

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  • Market failure in open access fisheries usually results in economic losses, because the most efficient means of harvesting fish resources are not used, and because fish resources are not allocated to the use with the highest social marginal value. In efficient, competitive markets, pricing mechanisms would ensure the optimal allocation of fish resources among alternative uses and between alternative users. However, because property rights over fish are poorly defined in open access fisheries, the market allocation and distribution of fish resources are not optimal. For this reason, governments have often directly managed fisheries on society's behalf. However, the involvement of government in fisheries management can lead to further misallocation of resources (O'Boyle 1993). This may arise where increased operational and adjustment costs, management costs and/or non-productive rent seeking behaviour by fishers and fishery managers exceeds the benefits from management. Moving fisheries management functions from under direct government control to control by a statutory body partly avoids this situation. However, devolving fisheries management does not guarantee that the interests of both society and the fishery managers will be achieved.For example, statutory fishery management agencies are often monopoly suppliers (Carter, Klein and Day 1990). Furthermore, because fishery management services are not supplied in the open market, management performance cannot be assessed by the willingness to pay of those receiving the service. Nor is it possible to use the competitive survival of specific services and organizations to indicate satisfactory fishery management outcomes. In addition to pursuing resource use efficiency, fishery managers are required to meet distributional and equity goals of governments regarding the resource access of various user groups. As a result, fishery managers often have to meet multiple performance objectives. The difficulties of achieving satisfactory fishery management performance, creates a need to monitor and control the performance of fishery management agencies to ensure that they pursue socially desired outcomes. Eichner and Brecher (1979) noted that program control is generally seen as being achieved through input regulation, or structural reform, including 'community' (client) control. They proposed that output monitoring should also be used. The control of Commonwealth fisheries management can be seen to be following a similar path of development. In response to these issues, the Commonwealth Government (1989) has initiated institutional changes to the management of Commonwealth fisheries. These include splitting control of the day-to-day operation of fisheries management off to a statutory body (the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, AFMA), requiring commercial fishers to pay those fishery management costs attributable to commercial fisheries, and developing and applying performance indicators to monitor fisheries management.
  • KEYWORDS: Cost recovery, Monitoring, Fishery management
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  • Campbell, David, Adam Stokes, Debbie Brown. 1996. Issues in monitoring fisheries management performance. Peer Review: No. In: Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 1-4, 1996, Marrakech, Morocco. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2002. CD ROM.
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