Experimental Analysis of Coordination of Fishing Effort to Reduce Dissipation of Economic Rent in Stock Enhancement Public Deposited

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  • Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have been used to control harvests and increase fisheries’ economic efficiency; however, they do not eliminate competitive fishing which can result in stock and congestion externalities that are especially apparent when resources are spatially heterogeneous within the controlled region of the ITQ system. These externalities arise because ITQ systems do not control the spatial distribution of effort leaving fishers to concentrate their effort in more profitable patches. We explored the potential for cooperative behavior to reduce this congestion using an experimental economics approach in the context of management of a stock enhancement program (SEP). Four treatments were applied involving different systems which were: compulsory, voluntary and by-use payment for the SEP, with either open or exclusive access to the enhanced zone (EZ). Income is either directly to individuals or split between participants through income-sharing (as occurs in cooperatives). Voluntary payment to fund the SEP enabled individuals to opt out of cooperation, which reduced the enhancement activity and led to a significantly lower cooperation than the optimal level and also lower relative to the compulsory payment system. Treatments that included a by-use payment combined with exclusive access to the EZ were most effective in preventing dissipation of economic rent. The different rule settings were affected by participants’ expectations of reciprocity, with greater involvement and thus production from the SEP amongst cooperative participants. Perceptions of vulnerability were also important, as more self-interested participants were more likely to exclude themselves from the SEP. The structure of rules may enable individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative to drive the fishery towards a state with low rent dissipation.
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  • León, Rafael, John Tisdell, Caleb Gardner, Klaas Hartmann, Ingrid van Putten, and Timothy Emery. 2015. Experimental Analysis of Coordination of Fishing Effort to Reduce Dissipation of Economic Rent in Stock Enhancement. In: Proceedings of the Eighth Biennial Forum of the North American Association of Fisheries Economists, May 20-22, 2015, Ketchikan, Alaska: Economic Sustainability, Fishing Communities and Working Waterfronts. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver and Melissa Errend. North American Association of Fisheries Economists, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2015.
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  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Susan Gilmont(susan.gilmont@orst.edu) on 2015-11-06T19:34:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Leon NAAFE 2015.pdf: 2305731 bytes, checksum: c6a54f1085444259275e8507f0d807b7 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Melissa Errend (melissa.errend@gmail.com) on 2015-11-06T18:04:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leon NAAFE 2015.pdf: 2305731 bytes, checksum: c6a54f1085444259275e8507f0d807b7 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-06T19:34:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leon NAAFE 2015.pdf: 2305731 bytes, checksum: c6a54f1085444259275e8507f0d807b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05

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