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Solving Congestion through ITQs: An Experimental Analysis

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  • Fishermen often have the choice of fishing at a number of sites in their region. Introducing tradeable fishing rights has a long pedigree in economic thought as an appropriate instrument to ensure an efficient distribution of fishers between sites. This paper explored the question of coordination between two sites‚ one inshore and one offshore in an experimental setting. The study looked for evidence of group coordination and speculates on the drivers of group coordination. The participants in the experiments were also presented with the opportunity to sell their right to fish at the inshore site in compensation for fishing at the offshore sites. The findings of the study provide interesting insights into group coordination and how ITQs work in resolving congestion questions.
  • Keywords: Fisheries Economics, Fisheries Management, Governance: Property Rights and Quota Systems II
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  • Tisdell, J. Solving Congestion through ITQs: An Experimental Analysis. In: Visible Possibilities: The Economics of Sustainable Fisheries, Aquaculture and Seafood Trade: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 16-20, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Edited by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2012.
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  • AQUAFISH, USAID, NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, Norad, The World Bank, Hyatt Regency Dar es Salaam, NAAFE, World Wildlife Fund, United Nations University Fisheries Training Programme, ICEIDA, JICA, JIFRS, The European Association of Fisheries Economists, International Seafood Sustainability Foundation
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