Optimal Management Under Asymmetric information: A Principal- Agent Analysis Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/3n2040255

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  • In the economic literature on fisheries management complete information is normally assumed. In reality fishermen have more information than the regulatory authority. In the present paper a principal-agent approach is applied to analyse management with a tax on fishing days under asymmetric information about the skill of fishermen (productivity) and fishing effort apart from fishing days. Regulation with a tax on fishing days does that and reaches a second-best optimal situation.
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  • Nielsen, Max, Frank Jensen and Peder Andersen. 2010. Optimal Management Under Asymmetric information: A Principal- Agent Analysis. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 13-16, 2010, Montpellier, France: Economics of Fish Resources and Aquatic Ecosystems: Balancing Uses, Balancing Costs. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2010.
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  • description.provenance : Submitted by Amy Zhang (zhanga@onid.orst.edu) on 2013-06-12T18:52:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 322.pdf: 16295 bytes, checksum: 670684f72456e1ff760282b4c0084321 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-12T18:52:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 322.pdf: 16295 bytes, checksum: 670684f72456e1ff760282b4c0084321 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010

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