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Optimal Management Under Asymmetric information: A Principal- Agent Analysis

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Abstract
  • In the economic literature on fisheries management complete information is normally assumed. In reality fishermen have more information than the regulatory authority. In the present paper a principal-agent approach is applied to analyse management with a tax on fishing days under asymmetric information about the skill of fishermen (productivity) and fishing effort apart from fishing days. Regulation with a tax on fishing days does that and reaches a second-best optimal situation.
  • Keywords: Fisheries Modeling, Modeling and Economic Theory, Fisheries Economics
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  • Nielsen, Max, Frank Jensen and Peder Andersen. 2010. Optimal Management Under Asymmetric information: A Principal- Agent Analysis. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 13-16, 2010, Montpellier, France: Economics of Fish Resources and Aquatic Ecosystems: Balancing Uses, Balancing Costs. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2010.
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  • US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries Division, Agence Française de Développement, Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche, Ministère de L’Alimentation de L’Agriculture et de la Pêche, Ministère de l’Énergie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer, La Région Languedoc Rouslilon, Département Hérault, Montpellier Agglomèration, The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada, and AquaFish Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP).
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