Experimental Testbedding Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/4x51hk30g

Research Paper

Descriptions

Attribute NameValues
Creator
Abstract or Summary
  • The objective of this paper is to illustrate that economic institutions matter, i.e., that different rules of trade present different incentives for bidding, asking and trading in new markets, and that these different incentives lead to different price discovery patterns which yield materially different outcomes. In a laboratory tradable fishing allowance system, when trade takes place through a double auction, which parallels an institution common in extant tradable allowance systems, markets are characterized by high volatility, and equilibrium does not obtain. However, when only leases, and not permanent trades, are permitted in the early periods, volatility is significantly reduced and equilibrium obtains. This dependence of equilibration and outcomes on institutions implies that policy-oriented economists must consider institutions in designing new market-based management systems.
Resource Type
Date Available
Date Issued
Citation
  • Anderson, Christopher, Jon G. Sutinen. 2004. Experimental Testbedding Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances. Peer Review: No. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 20-30, 2004, Tokyo, Japan: What are Responsible Fisheries? Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2004. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-0-7
Conference Name
Keyword
Subject
Rights Statement
Publisher
Peer Reviewed
Language
Replaces
Additional Information
  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Katy Davis(kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-12T23:56:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 131.pdf: 214251 bytes, checksum: 5af9e1a58e51df023f7059d3bbb39358 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Katy Davis (kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-12T23:32:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 131.pdf: 214251 bytes, checksum: 5af9e1a58e51df023f7059d3bbb39358 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-12T23:56:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 131.pdf: 214251 bytes, checksum: 5af9e1a58e51df023f7059d3bbb39358 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-11

Relationships

Parents:

This work has no parents.

Last modified

Downloadable Content

Download PDF

Items