Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.
Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.
Fishing is the most dangerous job in the United States. When fisheries management creates the incentive to "race for fish", a fishing season can be reduced to only a few days and involve around-the-clock fishing in life-threatening weather conditions. Overloaded vessels, ignoring maintenance problems on vessels, and fishing in dangerous conditions may be commonplace. However, catch share management can reduce the incentive to race for fish, and one of the many results of catch share management has been a significant decrease in the speed and intensity of fishing and a lengthening of the fishing season. This is expected to increase safety in fisheries. We evaluate the effect of the transition from limited entry to catch share management on risk-taking behavior in two important Pacific Northwest fisheries, the fixed gear sablefish fishery and the groundfish trawl fishery. The two fisheries had very different management institutions prior to their respective catch shares program. The fixed gear fishery had "derby" fishery characteristics, while the trawl fishery was managed with trip limits and area closures but was open year-round. The probability of fishing in poor weather conditions (spatially averaged maximum daily wind proxies weather conditions) is modeled conditional on expected profits, and describes a captain's propensity for risk taking. We find average maximum wind speed had a negative effect on the probability of going fishing in all management regimes, but is larger under catch shares for both fisheries. However, the effect was much larger in the case of the derby fishery.