Why Fish Auctions Differ – Theory and Practise Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/6969z179w

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  • In this paper we will study two auctions for fish found in Norway, and compare them applying auction theoretical assumptions. We will use the revenue equivalence theorem as a basis to explain why these two different auction mechanisms are chosen for the sale of fish. It is shown that the issues of risk aversion, common values and inclusion of travel costs may explain the choice of auction institution.
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  • Armstrong, C.W. Why Fish Auctions Differ – Theory and Practise. In: Microbehavior and Macroresults:Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute ofFisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA.Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. InternationalInstitute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.
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  • Johnston, Richard S.
  • Shriver, Ann L.
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  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-13T15:52:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 103.pdf: 46332 bytes, checksum: 7c507504de8932f4a97c9f525bc352b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Janet Webster (janet.webster@oregonstate.edu) on 2012-07-13T15:52:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 103.pdf: 46332 bytes, checksum: 7c507504de8932f4a97c9f525bc352b6 (MD5)

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