In this paper we will study two auctions for fish found in Norway, and compare them applying auction theoretical assumptions. We will use the revenue equivalence theorem as a basis to explain why these two different auction mechanisms are chosen for the sale of fish. It is shown that the issues of risk aversion, common values and inclusion of travel costs may explain the choice of auction institution.
Key words: fish auctions, Norway, revenue equivalence
Armstrong, C.W. Why Fish Auctions Differ – Theory and Practise. In: Microbehavior and Macroresults: Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA. Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.