Integrating Different User Groups into Fishery Management Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/6q182n06s

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.

Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.

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  • Different user groups have different stakes in fisheries. The societal challenge is that, exploiting the same fish stock, or ecologically interacting stocks, recreational and customary fishermen interact with a continuum of commercial fishermen, ranging from very small-scale and part-time artisanal fishermen to large-scale fishing firms. In this paper we develop a theoretical framework of fisheries management that integrate different user groups and internalize externalities between them. An optimal allocation of resource use rights among user groups is required (a) to maximize the societal benefits withdrawn from living marine resources, (b) to prevent overexploitation of fish stocks and (c) to improve the economic benefits derived by the various users of the fishery. Tackling the conservation, social equity, and economic efficiency challenges inherent to resource allocation, we identify, in a first stage, general principles of optimal quota allocation among the different user groups, given an exogenous TAC. We proceed to an numerical application of our static optimization framework to the case of the German commercial and recreational cod fisheries in the western Baltic sea. Drawing on this application of our model, we assess the deadweight loss subsequent to an imperfect harvesting quota market. In a second stage, we derive the joint total allowable catch (TAC) for all user groups at a socially optimal level. The TAC is optimal in the sense of maximizing the total economic value of the resource in consistency with sustainability and social goals, jointly for the different user groups.
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  • description.provenance : Submitted by IIFET Student Assistant (iifetstudentassistant@gmail.com) on 2017-03-09T23:26:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Regnier42ppt.pdf: 2636000 bytes, checksum: c8ca75c4062b6f2d192f82d2d1bf2593 (MD5)
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  • 0976343290

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