Fisheries Enforcement When Avoidance Is Possible Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/6w924c63f

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  • When fishers can avoid detection and/or sanctions for violating fisheries management rules, the fisheries enforcement problem becomes substantially more complicated. A number of issues immediately pop up. First, the effectiveness of enforcement effort is reduced. This, ceteris paribus, reduces the optimal enforcement effort. Second, the impact on the fishery of increasing enforcement effort or penalties for violations is no longer clear cut. When fishers can take steps to avoid detection or sanctions, it is possible that the relationship between the level of violations and the level of penalties or enforcement effort is reversed; i.e. higher penalties lead to more violations and vice versa. The third issue relates to the net social benefits obtainable from a fishery under these circumstances. Is it possible that most or all of the potential fisheries rents may be dissipated by the cost of increased avoidance activity? This paper deals with these issues. It constructs a simple model of the enforcement problem under avoidance and attempts, on that basis, to provide partial answers to the questions raised above.
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  • Arnason, Ragnar. 2010. Fisheries Enforcement When Avoidance Is Possible. 8 pages. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 13-16, 2010, Montpellier, France: Economics of Fish Resources and Aquatic Ecosystems: Balancing Uses, Balancing Costs. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2010.
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