Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.
The way of individual (fishing) quota is now widely recognized as a useful way for fishing resource management. However, even in the (internationally) shared resources, distributions of non-transferable fishing quota for each country should be justified, shouldn't be? The research considers the logistics "to begin with" in the theoretical international trade, general equilibrium models with shared resources as differential games. If the quota system is justified, the following both-countries' incomplete specialization equilibrium should exist: in the case each country non-cooperatively does his/her best including the choice of fishing quota and the movement common price as a choice variable under the constraint of internationally shared demand-supply equation. In the equilibrium, to satisfy the quota, some people works as fisherpersons, and others does not, but the case is over-fishing. In the research with differential games, it is appeared that the equilibrium cannot exist in any transition process. Moreover, the result can be kept not only in the case that the open-loop is chosen as a solution concept, but also Feedback-Nash equilibrium is chosen. The result means that distributions of non-transferable quota cannot be justified in the shared resources under the concept of the maximization of each country's economic welfare.