Policy-induced Market Failure Under the American Fisheries Act Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/c821gk67k

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  • This paper explores the political economy of using fishery cooperatives to advance voluntary decapitalization and rationalization that the U. S. Congress intended to benefit both vessels and processors. Game theory offers insights into the likelihood of achieving congressional intent. It is argued that the American Fisheries Act introduces a potential new market failure while attempting to rid the fishery of the open access externality.
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  • Matulich, S.C., F. Inaba and M. Sever. Policy-induced Market Failure Under the American Fisheries Act. In: Microbehavior and Macroresults:Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute ofFisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA.Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. InternationalInstitute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.
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  • Johnston, Richard S.
  • Shriver, Ann L.
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  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-05T21:02:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 120.pdf: 71413 bytes, checksum: 71e316de8a1716638053f7a4c79dde05 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Janet Webster (janet.webster@oregonstate.edu) on 2012-07-05T21:02:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 120.pdf: 71413 bytes, checksum: 71e316de8a1716638053f7a4c79dde05 (MD5)

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