|Abstract or Summary
- While rights-based management is generally purported enhance economic efficiency in fisheries and reduce over-capitalization, the social and economic outcomes due to this regulatory regime are less comprehensively understood. Relatively recently, industrialized and export-oriented Latin American fisheries began adopting individual transferable quota (ITQ) regimes to recover collapsed fish stocks. While these programs tend to follow standard, Western approaches to ITQ design and implementation, Argentina experimented with a new design model by interjecting social and ecological objectives into ITQ design through the creation of Artisanal and Social Quota reserves and through determining initial allocation based on historical vessel landings, employment, at-sea and on-land production, investment, historical landings across species, and record of fishery violations. In 2010, Argentina established ITQs for four commercially important and export-oriented fisheries: Argentine hake (Merluccius hubbsi), Patagonian grenadier (Macruronus magellanicus), Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides), and southern blue whiting (Micromesistius australis). The first part of this study, to be presented, is a comprehensive institutional analysis of the ITQ fishery management program in Argentina to preliminarily evaluate how configurations of rights-based managed influence social, economic, and ecological outcomes in regulated fisheries. This paper analyzes legislative documents and government data on program design, vessel landings, and participation in the ITQ program from 2000-2016, to evaluate how program design, specifically initial allocation and trading restrictions, potentially influences fishery outcomes. The results of this study are broadly applicable to understanding how the design of rights-based management regimes influence compliance behavior, social equity, and economic efficiency outcomes in developing country fisheries.