Conference Proceedings Or Journal
 

An Empirical Study of Common Property Fishery Resource: The Case of the Western-Central Pacific Ocean

Público Deposited

Conteúdo disponível para baixar

Baixar PDF
https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/cf95jc679

Descriptions

Attribute NameValues
Creator
Abstract
  • A dynamic game model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases both two equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese skipjack fishery in the Western-central Pacific Ocean. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the individual harvest rates and resource rent are consistent with theory.
  • Keywords: Common property resources, Theoretical and Empirical Bio-Economic Modelling, Empirical test, Fisheries Economics, Non-cooperative dynamic game, High seas fishery
Resource Type
Date Available
Date Issued
Citation
  • Naito, Toyokazu. 2002. An Empirical Study of Common Property Fishery Resource: The Case of the Western-Central Pacific Ocean. In: Proceedings of the Eleventh Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, August 19-22, 2002, Wellington, New Zealand: Fisheries in the Global Economy. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2002. CD ROM.
Conference Name
Subject
Declaração de direitos
Publisher
Peer Reviewed
Language
Replaces

Relações

Parents:

This work has no parents.

Em Collection:

Itens

Miniatura Título Data de carga Acesso Ações
file details G_052.pdf 2017-07-17 Público Baixar