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Imperfect Compliance, Credibility, and Heterogeneous Governance in a Metapopulation

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  • A model is described that characterizes the effect of costly information gathering, imperfect compliance, and costly monitoring, on the efficacy of central vs. local governance. The system considered is a common pool resource (CPR) with metapopulation structure, with each substock exploited by a different community. In the case of central control of a community, the regulator sets a limit on extraction, knowing that compliance will be incomplete. Precision of resource assessments, achieved through the exertion of costly survey effort, increases the credibility of regulations and enhances compliance by local harvesters, who juxtapose government assessments against their own. Following Sutinen and others, compliance can also be increased through costly enforcement effort. Self-governance by communities solves the credibility problem, but in general fails to adequately incorporate inter-area effects (externalities) or dynamic social costs of exploitation. Community attributes (tenure of participation and number of members) serve as proxies for the strength of social norms and the degree to which community decisions are dynamically efficient in aggregate in the absence of central control. Contrary to most models which consider different forms of governance, this analysis allows for dynamic and spatial heterogeneity in governance across the resource. Depending on the nature of externalities and the attributes of exploiting communities, a central planner may opt for different types of governance at different points in time of in different substocks. An application to groundfish management in the Gulf of Maine (Northeastern US) is briefly discussed.
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  • Herrera, Guillermo. 2004. Imperfect Compliance, Credibility, and Heterogeneous Governance in a Metapopulation. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 20-30, 2004, Tokyo, Japan: What are Responsible Fisheries? Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2004. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-0-7
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