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Resource Sharing - Setting and Evaluating the Scene Pubblico Deposited

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  • It is now widely acknowledged that an explicit and well-defined fishery property rights regime can enable the sustainable utilisation, and the long term protection of the marine environment. Within the commercial sector, formal and legally binding trade, exchange, and/or access sharing mechanisms have existed for many years. Trade and exchange is transacted at commercial rates in measurable units of access –for example catch quotas and/or gear entitlements. Where the community’s aspirations for development of fisheries for all stakeholders and long term protection of the marine environment are to be met, resource sharing regimes that encompass all user groups across a range of fishery scenarios need to be established. Such regimes necessarily will involve consistent and agreed definitions of respective use and access rights, and should include secure and effective mechanisms for exchange within a framework based on property law. The absence of formal and legally binding resource sharing mechanisms based on explicit rights across user groups – such as recreational, commercial charter, seafood industry, and customary/indigenous extractive users – ensures that allocation decisions by Governments will continue to be subject to political lobby and contest rather than be consistent with the most effective and efficient sustainable use of fisheries and shellfish resources negotiated and agreed by stakeholders. Under most current access sharing arrangements Governments are faced with continually having to revisit allocations, as the political lobby and populist conservation and social philosophies pressure them for exclusive and/or priority allocations to be made for reasons other than sustainable utilisation. In any event regardless of initial allocation, a system that does not adapt to changing demands will generate pressures for re-allocations. Enduring resource sharing mechanisms have the potential to bring certainty to all current and future stakeholders whilst creating strong incentives to ensure sustainability of fish stocks and the ecosystems that sustain them.
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  • Leyland, Guy, Roger Edwards, George Kailis, Daryl Sykes. 2002. Resource Sharing - Setting and Evaluating the Scene. Peer Review: No. In: Proceedings of the Eleventh Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, August 19-22, 2002, Wellington, New Zealand: Fisheries in the Global Economy. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2002. CD ROM.
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