Modelling Individual-Vessel Shadow Prices for Quota Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/k3569540p

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  • The purpose of this research is to model and measure shadow prices for quota that are not only vessel-specific but also conditioned upon the fisher's own quota holdings and individual circumstances regarding fishing effort. Shadow prices reflect the scarcity value of quota to each particular fisher and can be used to determine the maximum amount that each fisher would be willing to pay in order to purchase a one unit increase in quota. The fishery of interest is the Canadian Scotia-Fundy mobile gear fishery. Individual transferable vessel quotas were introduced for the 1991 fishing season for the three main species: cod, haddock and pollock. Using individual vessel data a restricted normalized quadratic profit function is used in estimation. The quadratic form is used here because of the ease of imposing regularity conditions. The model is specified imposing no restrictions on economies of scale but using an instrumental variable technique to account for possible correlation of fixed output levels with the residuals prior to 1991. Vessels are assumed to minimise the cost of harvesting quota regulated species and maximise profits over unregulated landings. The shadow value is measured as the value to the vessel of an increase in quota holdings. This includes a change in non-quota restricted profit caused by an increase in marginal cost from a one unit increase in quota landings, and a change in restricted profit due to the substitute/complementary relationship between non-quota and quota landings. The shadow value to the vessel is the price of quota fish minus the change in restricted profit. Changing regulatory polices will impact the value that fishers place on quota and knowledge of this value will allow regulators to identify types of transactions that might take place. Because shadow values are conditioned upon other quota holdings, fishery managers can influence the value fishers place on quota by changes in other quota holdings.
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  • Gordon, Daniel and Diane Dupont. 2006. Modelling Individual-Vessel Shadow Prices for Quota. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 11-14, 2006, Portsmouth, UK: Rebuilding Fisheries in an Uncertain Environment. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2006. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-3-1
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