What Kinds of Japanese Strategies are Pareto Improving: The case of Skipjack Tuna fisheries in the Pacific Ocean Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/mp48sj64b

Abstract Only

Descriptions

Attribute NameValues
Creator
Abstract or Summary
  • In the Pacific Ocean, the total catch of skipjack tuna has been increasing rapidly. Then, eight of Polynesian, Melanesian, and Micronesian countries (PNA countries) have concluded a cooperative management of tuna fisheries. Although those countries do not catch a large amount by themselves, the main migrating area is included in the EEZ of those countries. Therefore, they can behave as a monopolist who sells fisheries rights to fishing countries. Different from other fishing countries, Japan has a specific feature: it catches skipjack tuna both in the EEZ of PNA countries and its own EEZ by using different fishing gears. Moreover, the stock in the EEZ of Japan depends on that of PNA countries, because small groups of one-year-old skipjacks leave the EEZ of PNA countries and go to the North. We apply the Non-cooperative Game Theory to this fisheries management. If there were no ‚“small groups”, the amount of quotas sold to fishing countries would be insufficient in terms of total welfare of fishing and resource countries. However, the amount of catch may be excessive in the presence of the‚ “small groups.” Therefore, we examine the strategies for Japan to improve both Japan‚ welfare and total welfare, such as unilateral vessel reduction, compensation schemes to other fishing countries, and contribution to the establishment of the surveillance system. We also examine negotiation/transaction rules of fishing rights, and the area of EEZ.
Resource Type
Date Available
Date Issued
Citation
  • Higasgida, K. What Kinds of Japanese Strategies are Pareto Improving: The case of Skipjack Tuna Fisheries in the Pacific Ocean. In: Visible Possibilities: The Economics of Sustainable Fisheries, Aquaculture and Seafood Trade: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 16-20, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Edited by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2012.
Conference Name
Keyword
Subject
Rights Statement
Funding Statement (additional comments about funding)
Publisher
Peer Reviewed
Language
Replaces
Additional Information
  • description.provenance : Rejected by Janet Webster(janet.webster@oregonstate.edu), reason: Looks like the abstract is incomplete on this. Do you have another source for the abstracts? Otherwise, we might have to edit it. THanks. -Janet on 2013-10-31T21:55:32Z (GMT)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Martin Eberle Jr (eberlem@onid.orst.edu) on 2013-10-25T21:42:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Higashida-71.pdf: 7095 bytes, checksum: 45db09ef5dc070e19fcfa31d09cdcd8e (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Martin Eberle Jr (eberlem@onid.orst.edu) on 2013-11-12T21:18:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Higashida-71.pdf: 6951 bytes, checksum: 11ea8591f27245e58dd9595b53ac9d0d (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Janet Webster(janet.webster@oregonstate.edu) on 2013-11-26T21:16:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Higashida-71.pdf: 6951 bytes, checksum: 11ea8591f27245e58dd9595b53ac9d0d (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-26T21:16:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Higashida-71.pdf: 6951 bytes, checksum: 11ea8591f27245e58dd9595b53ac9d0d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012

Relationships

In Administrative Set:
Last modified: 11/01/2017

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Citations:

EndNote | Zotero | Mendeley

Items