A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/ng451j79c

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  • Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher than socially optimal. On the other hand, if the owner can choose the number of firms it does not place any restrictions on entry to the EEZ and selects a fee that maximizes net return.
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  • Wachsman, Yoav. 2002. A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries. In: Proceedings of the Eleventh Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, August 19-22, 2002, Wellington, New Zealand: Fisheries in the Global Economy. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2002. CD ROM.
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  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Katy Davis(kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-28T21:42:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 C_217.pdf: 196215 bytes, checksum: 1b104c116c76d0a49816e3280f1cea06 (MD5)
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  • description.provenance : Submitted by Katy Davis (kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-28T20:25:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 C_217.pdf: 196215 bytes, checksum: 1b104c116c76d0a49816e3280f1cea06 (MD5)

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