Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/nv935414r

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  • When several new species are introduced into the New Zealand Quota Management System in the near future, some of the quota, or single-year annual catch entitlement (ACE), will be tendered through competitive auctions rather than allocated based on historical catch. This study uses a laboratory experiment calibrated to a representative New Zealand fishery to assess three sealed-bid auctions. In all three auctions, the N units of ACE for sale are allocated to the N highest bidders, but there are three different rules for determining trade prices: an Nth price auction, in which all the trades are executed at a price of last accepted bid; an N+1st price auction, in which all trades are executed at a price of the highest rejected bid; and a discriminative auction, in which all trades are executed at the bid price. There is no statistical difference in efficiency among the auctions, but there is a clear, statistically significant ordering of revenue capture: the discriminative auction captures an average of 78% of the surplus: the Nth price auction 69% of the surplus; and the N+1st price auction captures 57% of the surplus. When a secondary market provides the opportunity for trades following the auction, the added complexity of the bidding strategy in the discriminative auction led to more inefficient trades, and offered more opportunity for speculation than the other two auctions.
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  • Anderson, Christopher, Daniel S. Holland. 2004. Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement. Peer Review: No. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 20-30, 2004, Tokyo, Japan: What are Responsible Fisheries? Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2004. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-0-7
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  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-13T21:27:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 135.pdf: 301725 bytes, checksum: 4595036b6a99818a9f1e7182634a327b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-11
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Katy Davis (kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-13T20:18:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 135.pdf: 301725 bytes, checksum: 4595036b6a99818a9f1e7182634a327b (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Katy Davis(kdscannerosu@gmail.com) on 2015-08-13T21:27:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 135.pdf: 301725 bytes, checksum: 4595036b6a99818a9f1e7182634a327b (MD5)

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