Common Pool Politics and inefficient Fishery Management Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/nz8060836

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  • The main instrument used in fishery management is the total allowable catch (TAC). Fishery management often fails because TACs are set too high and do not sufficiently restrict fisheries. The question we address in this paper is why do decision makers choose inefficiently high TACs? Our approach is to model the annual negotiation as a dynamic non-cooperative game in discrete time. We assume two types of decision makers. The "patient" type prefers fishing in the future. The "impatient" type prefers fishing today. Decisions on TACs are made by majority voting. We show that despite forward-looking profit maximization the impatient decision makers have an incentive to choose a higher TAC than would be optimal for them because of an anticipation effect. The impatient majority has to consider that in the next period the patient majority might rule which chooses lower TACs. To compensate for the lower catch the impatient decision makers choose higher TACs in the current period. Under cooperation, binding agreements on lower TACs could be implemented which can lead to a more successful fishery management.
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  • Hoffman, Julia and M.F. Quaas. 2014. Common Pool Politics and inefficient Fishery Management. In: Towards ecosystem based management of fisheries: what role can economics play?: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 7-11, 2014, Brisbane, Australia. Complied by Ann L. Shriver & Melissa Errend. Corvallis, OR: International Institute of Fisheries.
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  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-19T18:21:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 julia_hoffmann_iifet.pdf: 518135 bytes, checksum: 5ee4bbbfcd1a81a1d5129659b31ad1c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-07
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