Strategies of Game Theory in the Marketing of Marine Catch for Small, Medium and Large Fishermen Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/qf85nc08w

IIFET 2008 paper presentation by Nik Hashim Nik Mustapha from the University of Malaysia Terengganu.

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  • There are two distinctive issues in marketing of fishermen catch; one is the issue of agent-principal relationship due to asymmetric information whereby the agent takes over the function of marketing once the catch is landed. There has been allegation that giving of credit is a form of trade that benefits the agent who has control over the daily fishermen catch. Another form of marketing strategy which I believe have never been investigated before at least in Malaysia or in fishing industry is the way by which fishermen catches are brought to the market place. Many studies and analysis found that those who have dominant strategy in the market will be affected by the way simultaneous or sequential, collusive or non-collusive marketing strategies. This study is intended to verify the theoretical findings of game theory with the empirical evidences using real world data from fisheries statistics.
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  • Nik Mustapha, Nik Hashim. 2008. Strategies of Game Theory in the Marketing of Marine Catch for Small, Medium and Large Fishermen. 12 pages. In: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 22-25, 2008, Nha Trang, Vietnam: Achieving a Sustainable Future: Managing Aquaculture, Fishing, Trade and Development. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2008.
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