Deterring Poaching from a Common Pool: Experimental Evidence from TURFs in Chile Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/qr46r266s

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.

Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.

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  • While the literature that uses economic experiments to investigate self-governance of common pool resources is large, almost none of it is concerned with protecting resources from outside incursion. This work presents the results of an economic field experiment designed to study behavioral issues related to both the protection of a common-pool resource from poaching by outsiders, and the problem of managing a local common resource within a group under the presence of outsiders when enforcement is imperfect and costly.  We have two specific objectives.  First, to study the ability of group members to manage the resource in the presence of poaching.  We examine the consequences of the inclusion of additional subjects, called "outsiders," who do not have the right to harvest the resource or participate in management decisions, but can decide to encroach on the TURF and poach the resource.  Second, to study different methods for the "insiders" to monitor the resource and impose sanctions. In all cases, monitoring is imperfect (i.e., there is a chance that poaching will not be detected). Enforcement treatments in our experiment include: i) relying on an external agency to provide enforcement; and ii) allowing insiders to share the responsibility of monitoring the resource at a personal cost. The experiments were conducted in the field with 204 members of local artisanal fishing organizations in central-southern Chile.  The participants are members of organizations exploiting benthic resources under TURFs regulation. 
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  • 0976343290

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