Conference Proceedings Or Journal | Distributional Performance of a Territorial Use Right and Co-Managed Small-Scale Fishery Targeting a Metapopulation Using Artificial Shelters | ID: qr46r473m | translation missing: it.hyrax.product_name
Suggested Bibliographic Reference: NAAFE Forum 2017 Proceedings, March 22-24, 2017. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver with assistance from Stefani Evers. North American Association of Fisheries Economists (NAAFE), Corvallis, 2017.
This work reports on how resource rent is distributed among owners of exclusive fishing grounds in the spiny lobster (Panulirus argus) fishery of Punta Allen, Mexico. This MSC certified small-scale fishery is co-managed through Territorial User Rights. Members of the local fishing cooperative, have exclusive access to individual fishing grounds. The fishery is based on the use of artificial shelters, bottom devices that by providing refuge attract and aggregate lobsters facilitating their harvest by free diving and hand nets. In order to assess the distributive performance of this fishery, data from the fishing cooperative logbooks were used to calculate the fishing resource rent achieved spatially by the owners of fishing grounds and corresponding artificial shelters invested in them. Inequality metrics (Lorenz Curve and Gini index) were applied to the calculated fishery distributional performance indicators. The individual resource rent analysis was spatially undertaken considering the transfer cost of steaming from port to alternative exclusive fishing grounds, the corresponding cost of fishing and the opportunity cost of the investments in site specific artificial shelters and fishing assets (i.e. boat, engine and gears). The Gin index presented relatively low values [0.372, 0.429]. Results showed that in this lobster fishery, fishing revenues spread more equally than other fisheries where their distributional performances have been assessed. These results suggest that the relative success of this MSC certified small-scale lobster fishery could be explained in part by the relatively low inequality in the distribution of the benefits among fishers of this rights based fishery.