frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the
Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes
of such long-run resource problems could be more
accurately characterised in terms of a «Tragedy of High
Prices» due to landings prices exceeding fishing costs at
the socially optimal level of resource use.
In tackling over-exploitation problems, the feasibility and
relative efficiency of demand-side measures in attaining
management objectives without necessitating
introduction of other fishing rights is discussed.
Distributional issues associated with using a market
mechanism to allocate use rights and potential adoption
of demand-side measures within a co-management
framework are considered.
Despite apparently desirable properties, solutions based
upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected
in the literature, and rarely put into practice. Discussion
of such systems provides a contribution towards the continuing debate regarding how best to improve
fisheries management, to ensure that economic rents are
neither purely dissipated, nor simply captured by a first
generation of resource users.
Valatin, G. On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries. In: Microbehavior and Macroresults:Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute ofFisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA.Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. InternationalInstitute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.