International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/s1784m74w

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  • When a resource shifts from one player to another, e.g. due to climate change, the conservation incentive of the player losing the resource decreases while the conservation incentive increases for the player at the receiving end. We set up an analytical model to study how the structure of the game changes when the shift occurs either fast or slow, or gradual or abrupt. We also investigate whether there is a self-enforcing agreement that aligns incentives. We find that the longer the expected duration of the shift, the less intensive the exploitation of the resource and the larger the scope for cooperation. In some cases there is no stable agreement, even when there are only two players.
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  • Nieminen E. and Diekert, F. 2014. International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock. In: Towards ecosystem based management of fisheries: what role can economics play?: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 7-11, 2014, Brisbane, Australia. Complied by Ann L. Shriver & Melissa Errend. Corvallis, OR: International Institute of Fisheries.
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  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-02T16:38:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Nieminen236.pdf: 911982 bytes, checksum: e52069c40c46cf8d7c4f5d5fcc489d0b (MD5) IIFET 2014_session3.5_Nieminen.pdf: 788271 bytes, checksum: a6eda5f88144fb683f47fd1016fc3572 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-07
  • description.provenance : Rejected by Susan Gilmont(susan.gilmont@orst.edu), reason: .ppt file should be .pdf on 2015-01-29T17:34:56Z (GMT)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Melissa Errend (melissa.errend@gmail.com) on 2015-01-31T17:15:15Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Nieminen236.pdf: 911982 bytes, checksum: e52069c40c46cf8d7c4f5d5fcc489d0b (MD5) IIFET 2014_session3.5_Nieminen.pdf: 788271 bytes, checksum: a6eda5f88144fb683f47fd1016fc3572 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Melissa Errend (melissa.errend@gmail.com) on 2015-01-15T05:50:34Z No. of bitstreams: 2 IIFET 2014_session3.5_Nieminen.pptx: 588932 bytes, checksum: 3a4497b43116e8bf397f802c90c8cf89 (MD5) Nieminen236.pdf: 911982 bytes, checksum: e52069c40c46cf8d7c4f5d5fcc489d0b (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Janet Webster(janet.webster@oregonstate.edu) on 2015-02-02T16:38:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Nieminen236.pdf: 911982 bytes, checksum: e52069c40c46cf8d7c4f5d5fcc489d0b (MD5) IIFET 2014_session3.5_Nieminen.pdf: 788271 bytes, checksum: a6eda5f88144fb683f47fd1016fc3572 (MD5)

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