The Number of Players in a Fisheries Game: Curse or Blessing? Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/s1784q65j

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.

Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.

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  • In a non-cooperative fishing game of two players, one single player must be sufficiently dominant in order to have an incentive to conserve the stock. Maximum growth rate of fish stocks could often be too low in order to provide a conservation incentive for a dominant player. The fish catch left for the dominant player could be much less than that taken by the free rider and be considered unfair. As the number of players increases it becomes less likely that the any single one will be sufficiently dominant to have an incentive to conserve the fish stock. Would this necessarily mean that fish stocks are increasingly likely to be exploited to extinction as the number of players increases? Would not players prefer to avoid annihilation of their fisheries even if no single one is dominant enough to conserve the stock in its own interest? This, at any rate, seems to have happened in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery where no player is dominant enough for this purpose. Despite no comprehensive formal cooperation and much rhetoric the parties have set themselves rather cautious fish quotas. An otherwise assured mutual destruction could prompt the parties sharing a fish stock to cooperate, at least informally, even if no single party in dominant enough to conserve the stock. This could even produce a better situation than when one of two parties is able to free ride on the dominant party, leaving a grossly small catch to be taken by the dominant party.
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  • 0976343290

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