Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.
In this paper an unregulated, but not open-access, fishery is studied and it is analyzed how more modern fishing technology may be a mixed blessing not only for the fish abundance, but also for the rent. The model is formulated in section two where it is included a strategic interaction among the fishermen channeled through the market price for fish. The intertemporal equilibrium is solved through a Nash-Cournot game. We made a distinction between a search and a schooling fishery. In section three we study the effect of technological improvement in the search fishery. The schooling fishery is considered in section four while section five concludes the paper. It is demonstrated that more modern fishing technology has a two-sided profitability effect, and where the direct, short-run, positive effect is counterbalanced by a negative, long-run, indirect effect that slows down the stock growth and increases the harvesting costs. In the steady state in the search fishery, more modern technology will dissipate the rent under an already high exploitation pressure, while the opposite occurs if the fish stock is initially little, or moderately, exploited. In a schooling fishery, and when the fish stock is not depleted, more modern technology fishery increases the rent. The paper provides also several other results.