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Co-management and cooperative self-enforcement Public Deposited

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  • The paper focuses on the combination of the cooperative fisheries management with the non-cooperative literature. It has important modeling contributions by creating a new framework on co-management. The structure of the model is repeated coalition game with the possibility to deviate combined with introduction of a variation of a club good model. The club good is defined as an information flow in the coalition implying acting as a singleton is costlier compared to joint production. This model provides a more optimistic view of coalition formation than is traditionally seen. The model can explain the real-world cases of strong fishing community cooperation arising even with a large set of players.
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  • Seattle, Washington, USA
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