Co-management and cooperative self-enforcement

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Citeable URL: https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/t148fp07q

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Attribute Name	Values
Creator	Grønbæk, Lone Lindroos, Marko
Abstract	The paper focuses on the combination of the cooperative fisheries management with the non-cooperative literature. It has important modeling contributions by creating a new framework on co-management. The structure of the model is repeated coalition game with the possibility to deviate combined with introduction of a variation of a club good model. The club good is defined as an information flow in the coalition implying acting as a singleton is costlier compared to joint production. This model provides a more optimistic view of coalition formation than is traditionally seen. The model can explain the real-world cases of strong fishing community cooperation arising even with a large set of players.
Resource Type	Presentation
Date Issued	2018
Conference Name	International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade
Conference Location	Seattle, Washington, USA
权利声明	In Copyright
Publisher	International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade
Peer Reviewed	No
Language	English [eng]

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