Among other mechanisms, the Chilean fishing act established a system of extraordinary fishing permits (EFP) to access the fisheries in stage of recovery or incipient stage of development. The EFP entitles its holder the right to catch during 10 years a fraction of the global annual quota. The right is obtained through auction where one tenth of the global quota is offered annually. Auction results show concentration of the ITSQ for squat lobster in few firms and there is also evidence of cooperation among them within this market. Although the fleet capacity is somewhat less than in previous periods under free access, the fishing season is now longer; fishing firms look for maximizing the value of the catch by distributing the fishing effort throughout the season to obtain the highest fishing yields. The fishery resource has kept high level of biomass since the ITSQ were introduced, but it is not possible to assert that there is a correlation between the two.
Keywords: individual transferable quotas, fishing rights, auction of fishing rights
Cerda-Amico, R.J. and M. Urbina-Veliz. ITSQ in Chilean Fisheries: The Case of the Squat Lobster (Pleuroncodes monodon). In: Microbehavior and Macroresults: Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon, USA. Compiled by Richard S. Johnston and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2001.