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Abstract
  • Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some n countries harvest a common fish stock x. For this common resource they attempt to achieve an agreement that would be beneficial to all countries. The present paper considers cases where the countries may be involved in several coexisting agreements. We identify three cases where the issue may be important. In case one we have one stock and many potential agreements, e.g.. countries (1,2) and (3,4) sign bilateral agreements. In case two we have a two-species fishery, where an agreement is needed for both species x and y. Finally, in case three we may have some countries that find it optimal to be part of several parallel agreements concerning the same fishery.
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Citation
  • Lindroos, Marko. 2006. Parallel Fisheries Agreements. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 11-14, 2006, Portsmouth, UK: Rebuilding Fisheries in an Uncertain Environment. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2006. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-3-1
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Subject
Dichiarazione dei diritti
Funding Statement (additional comments about funding)
  • The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration Marine Fisheries Service, United States Department of Commerce (NOAA Fisheries); United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); The United States Agency for International Development supported Aquaculture Collaborative Research and Support Program (ACRSP).
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