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Influence of Discount Rates and Catch Levels on the Negotiation of Fishing Rights Public Deposited

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  • When dealing with time, a fishery manager faces a major difficulty. On an N-period time horizon, should he follow several short-run objectives for every n sub-period, or should he consider only the long-run objective? If a European manager trying to implement a stock recovery plan prefers to achieve the long-run objective as rapidly as possible, will the member-state governments follow the same guideline with their own goals? They may prefer a shorter horizon matching their own political cycle. Suppose the European Commissioner wants to reduce the fishing capacity within five years along a monotonic decommissioning scheme, one of the member-states might keep on fishing with the same level of effort for one or two years before reducing its fishing fleet. On the basis of a non-cooperative game, this communication looks at the role of a mediator (say the European Commissioner in charge of negotiating the sharing of fish quotas between the member states) whose goal is twofold: the recovery of fish stocks and the search for optimal solutions between member-states having different discount rates and different catch levels. This optimal solution is obtained through a jointly-improving process. Both level of catches (size of the country) and time preferences (discount rates) are supposed to affect the result of the negotiation, as well as the negotiating procedure itself (several bargaining methods are compared). The introduction of a new country in the process (e.g. a new member state), by creating opportunities of coalition, is also likely to affect the role of the mediator.
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  • Guillotreau, Patrice and Thomas Vallee. 2006. Influence of Discount Rates and Catch Levels on the Negotiation of Fishing Rights. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 11-14, 2006, Portsmouth, UK: Rebuilding Fisheries in an Uncertain Environment. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2006. CD ROM. ISBN 0-9763432-3-1
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  • The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration Marine Fisheries Service, United States Department of Commerce (NOAA Fisheries); United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); The United States Agency for International Development supported Aquaculture Collaborative Research and Support Program (ACRSP).
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