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Can A 'Feasible' Rent Collector Earn His Hire? Public Deposited

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  • Price instruments are rarely seen in fisheries despite their many desirable properties. In this paper, I find new reasons to favor price instruments in a fishery. Given constraints on information and enforcement precluding the optimum optimorum, I consider a second-best but welfare improving policy when catch limits cannot be enforced and there are insufficient data to reliably estimate biological and technological parameters. I develop a 'feasible' tax for heterogeneous fishing grounds requiring only random observations on catches, prices and effort. Through simulations, I evaluate the performance of the 'feasible' tax relative to fishery-statistics based management policies. I calculate 'feasible' taxes using harvest and effort data from Gulf of California Mangrove-associated species. The short panel data demonstrate spatial variability in revenue-per-unit-effort. This variation is best explained empirically by Mangrove variability. The 'feasible' tax exploits spatial variation in fish stock productivity as a function of the natural capital input, Mangrove-fringe length. Using a standard bioeconomic model calibrated to these data, I use computer simulations of bioeconomic equilibria to revisit Samuelson's rent collector and ask: how much of the rent collector's earnings must be transferred to labor for labor to favor the policy?
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  • Murray, Jason. 2010. Can A 'Feasible' Rent Collector Earn His Hire? In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, July 13-16, 2010, Montpellier, France: Economics of Fish Resources and Aquatic Ecosystems: Balancing Uses, Balancing Costs. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2010.
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  • US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries Division, Agence Française de Développement, Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche, Ministère de L’Alimentation de L’Agriculture et de la Pêche, Ministère de l’Énergie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer, La Région Languedoc Rouslilon, Département Hérault, Montpellier Agglomèration, The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada, and AquaFish Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP).
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