Catch Shares, the Theory of Cooperative Games and the Spirit of Elinor Ostrom: A Research Agenda Public Deposited

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  • This paper puts forth the proposition that all catch share schemes should be analysed primarily through the lens of cooperative game theory, which has now been developed to an advanced degree in the analysis of international fisheries management. If the fishers in a catch share scheme are playing cooperatively, the resource managers are at the same time to be seen as playing a leader-follower game with the fishers. While the proposition obviously applies to all catch share schemes, the focus of the paper will be on ITQ schemes. The basic rudiments of the required theory are to be found in a 2006 article by Lone Krønbak and Marko Lindroos, and carry with it the spirit of Elinor Ostrom. We will argue that much more needs to be done. We shall maintain that, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game, the various residual inefficiencies of ITQ schemes discussed in many articles should vanish. Needless to say, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game the distinction between it and other catch right schemes will blur. We shall also argue that, if ITQ schemes succeed as stable cooperative games, this will enable the fishers to bargain constructively with other stakeholders. Examples will be drawn, inter alia, from the evolving harvesting rights schemes off Canada’s Pacific coast.
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  • Munro, G., U.R. Sumaila & B. Turris. Catch Shares, the Theory of Cooperative Games and the Spirit of Elinor Ostrom: A Research Agenda. In: The Economics of Sustainable Fisheries, Aquaculture and Seafood Trade: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 16-20, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Edited by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2012.
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  • Formatted using Adobe Acrobat Pro. Filesize 140.37 kb. PDF file.
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  • description.provenance : Submitted by Ngaio Hotte (n.hotte@fisheries.ubc.ca) on 2012-09-24T19:50:05Z No. of bitstreams: 3 license_rdf: 22765 bytes, checksum: 56265f5776a16a05899187d30899c530 (MD5) license_text: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) CATCH SHARES, THE THEORY OF COOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE SPIRIT OF ELINOR OSTROM - A RESEARCH AGENDA.pdf: 143734 bytes, checksum: 438a3e88f5a5d08f6dfe822810f0fcc2 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Janet Webster(janet.webster@oregonstate.edu) on 2012-10-08T20:07:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 3 license_rdf: 22765 bytes, checksum: 56265f5776a16a05899187d30899c530 (MD5) license_text: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) CATCH SHARES, THE THEORY OF COOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE SPIRIT OF ELINOR OSTROM - A RESEARCH AGENDA.pdf: 143734 bytes, checksum: 438a3e88f5a5d08f6dfe822810f0fcc2 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-08T20:07:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 license_rdf: 22765 bytes, checksum: 56265f5776a16a05899187d30899c530 (MD5) license_text: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) CATCH SHARES, THE THEORY OF COOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE SPIRIT OF ELINOR OSTROM - A RESEARCH AGENDA.pdf: 143734 bytes, checksum: 438a3e88f5a5d08f6dfe822810f0fcc2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012

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