Sub-Perfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/defaults/7w62f8811

This is the author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and can be found at:  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291530-9134. To the best of our knowledge, one or more authors of this paper were federal employees when contributing to this work.

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  • This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association (NBA) referees. Using a sample of 28,388 quarter-level observations from six seasons, we find that referees make calls that favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase league revenues. In order to distinguish between referee and player behavior we use play-by-play data, which allow us to analyze turnovers referees have relatively high and low discretion over separately.
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  • Price, J., Remer, M. and Stone, D. F. (2012), Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 21: 271–300. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00325.x
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  • description.provenance : Approved for entry into archive by Deanne Bruner(deanne.bruner@oregonstate.edu) on 2013-04-09T21:31:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 StoneDanielEconomicsSubperfectGameProfitable.pdf: 211725 bytes, checksum: 48cbe0a7f31b0dfe9527a40c36190350 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Submitted by Deanne Bruner (deanne.bruner@oregonstate.edu) on 2013-04-09T21:30:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 StoneDanielEconomicsSubperfectGameProfitable.pdf: 211725 bytes, checksum: 48cbe0a7f31b0dfe9527a40c36190350 (MD5)
  • description.provenance : Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-09T21:31:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 StoneDanielEconomicsSubperfectGameProfitable.pdf: 211725 bytes, checksum: 48cbe0a7f31b0dfe9527a40c36190350 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-01-18

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