|Abstract or Summary
- Corruption has important implications for the proper implementation and success of public policies. A vast literature in the social sciences has highlighted important national attributes that propagate corruption within the public sector. Despite these vast literatures, less attention has focused on individual characteristics, outside of more basic cost/benefit analysis, that dictate whether individuals engage in corruption. In this capstone project, I examine how individual characteristics, particularly people’s identity and affiliation with mainstream political parties, influences the likelihood that an individual will sell their vote in a national election. I examine this issue with a new database provided by the Eunacal Institute from Albania, where corruption is particularly acute and has severely impacted government effectiveness. This survey contains information on individuals’ experience in selling votes in exchange for assurances of public sector employment, factoring their political affiliations and identities, their economic and educational backgrounds. Using logistic regression, I identified that, Socialist affiliated voters, were less likely to sell their vote compared to the Democratic affiliated voters and the Socialist movement for integration affiliated voters. I also found, socialist voters were less likely to sell their vote than the DP ones regardless their party affiliation due to weak party affiliation and the incumbent vote penalty. My findings have the potential to expand upon cost-benefit analysis, which focuses mostly on economic incentives, and highlight important social and political factors that influence one’s tolerance toward engaging in corruption in the public sector.