Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis Public Deposited

http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/sb397b301

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  • This dissertation contains theoretical and empirical analyses on common property fisheries resources. The theoretical analysis focuses on a highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) fishery, and examines the inefficiency caused by non-cooperative harvest. The empirical analysis focuses on a high seas fishery and conducts an empirical test on the effects of the current and future number of harvesters on equilibrium harvest and resource rents. In the theoretical analysis, a two period, non-cooperative, game-theoretic model is developed for an WvIFS fishery. In each period, the fish stock migrate from the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal state into the high seas, where distant-water fishing (DWF) harvesters may harvest them. It is shown that having an EEZ improves total welfare by reducing total harvest and the degree of the welfare improvement increases when the number of harvesters in an HMFS fishery increases. It is also shown that new entrants to an HMFS fishery lead to a larger harvest and rent dissipation. With open- Redacted for Privacy access in the second stage, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF harvesters but not for the coastal state harvesters, which still earn positive rent. In the empirical analysis, a dynamic Cournot model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will increase the collective equilibrium harvest level, but will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases all three equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese trawl fishery in the Bering Sea Donut Hole. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the collective and individual harvest rates and resource rents are consistent with theory.
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