Improving sustainability of Filipino tuna fisheries through private incentive mechanisms

July 8, 2014, Frazen Tolentino, Paul Berentsen, Simon Bush, Alfons Oude-Lansink

International Institute of Fisheries and Economics and Trade (IIFET) 2014, QUT, Gardens Point, Brisbane Australia





Overview of the presentation


- 1. Problem statement
- Tuna fishery and private incentive mechanisms
- Why focus on Filipino tuna fishers?
- 2. Objective and research questions of this paper
- 3. Global Value Chain (GVC) Analysis
 - What is upgrading?
 - The conditions for upgrading
- 4. Methodology
- 5. Results
- 6. Conclusions and recommendations




Problem Statement

- Tuna fishery
- Unsustainable fishing practices (Illegal Unreported Unregulated fishing, unsustainable fishing methods)
- Decline in fish stocks










Overfishing

Stock status of tuna species



Overfished

Figure 1. Stock status of yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack tuna using Kobe diagram (SPC, 2012)



Proliferation of market-based incentive mechanisms



- The failure of regulatory-based approach over fishery leads to a shift to private incentive mechanisms
- Target: changing fishers' fishing practices
- Means: provide economic incentives such as market access or price premiums, improved production efficiency
- ➤ Fishery Improvement Project (FIP), Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) association



INTERNATIONAL SEAFOOD

Why Filipino tuna fishers?

- One of the key players in Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)
- Continuous build-up of partnerships/alliances between Philippines and PNA countries
- 4th major producer in the world





Main objective and sub-research questions

- To analyse and compare the ways different types of private incentive mechanisms facilitate and influence upgrading of Filipino tuna fishers in the value chains.
- Sub-research questions:
- (1) In what ways do powerful actors in the chain or 'lead firms' use private incentive mechanisms to govern tuna value chains and to determine producers' terms of participation?



Sub research questions continued...

(2) In what manner does the existing institutional arrangement at the level of the producer where the private incentive mechanisms operate, influence the abilities of fishers to upgrade?

(3) In what ways do the governance of value chain and the institutional set-up at producer level determine fishers' upgrading strategies in each private incentive mechanism?




Theoretical framework

Global Value Chain (GVC) Analysis

GVC is method for understanding the participation of firms in an international chain (Gereffi et al. 1994)





Types of Upgrading

refers to the process of improving production to 'move up' the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002), while balancing rewards and risk" (Ponte and Ewert 2009)



Kinds of upgrading:


- > Improve product, process and volume
- Change or add functions
- Improve coordination ('vertical' and 'horizontal' contractualisation)



(Reference: Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Riisgaard et. al 2010)

Conditions for Upgrading

- Needs willingness to upgrade, explained by:
 - Capabilities
 - 'what people are able to do and to be' (Sen 1990, Nussbaum 2003).
 - Requires resources (material, relational, institutional)
 - Long-term goals (improvement in livelihoods, sustainable sources of income, minimise risks)









Methodology

Data Analysis

- Qualitative Method using multiple case studies
- GVC case study concepts defined and operationalised:
- 1. coordination for vertical dimension
- 2. institutional setting and institutional support for horizontal dimension
- 3. capabilities as influenced by both horizontal and vertical dimensions)
- Upgrading improvement in producti practices





Methodology (continued...)

Data Collection

- Review of scientific and grey literature
- 158 in-depth interviews with tuna fishery stakeholders for 10 months
- Fisheries site visit in Philippines: (Lagonoy Region, Occidental Mindoro, General Santos city, and Navotas Manila) and in Papua New Guinea: (Lae and Port Moresby)
- International industrial meetings









Results 1: vertical dimension

Chain governance by lead firms:

	FIP	MSC	ISSF
Species traded	 Yellowfin 	 Skipjack 	SkipjackYellowfin
Lead Firms	 European retailers (SeaFresh, Coop, Bell Seafood) 		 ISSF member brands and processors
Coordination instruments	Catch documentAccreditations	MSC certificateChain of Custody (CoC)B2B arrangement	 Pro-active Vessel Register (PVR)
Method of transmitting information	Stakeholder workshopsFisher meetingsExcursions	ManualsBusiness meetingsInternational conferencesInternet	Skippers' trainingInternational conferencesInternet

Results 1: (vertical) continued...

Fishers' terms of participation in the chain:

	FIP	MSC	ISSF	
Fisher-level requirements	Catch documentationHand line fishing	 Catch documentation Free school fishing Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 	Unique Vessel IdentifierSustainable FAD fishing	
Other specific product requirements	 ≥ 35 kilos tuna Grade A or export quality 	 Separate MSC- and non-MSC fish, Canning grade quality 	Canning grade qualitySize-requirement	



Results 2: horizontal dimension

- 2. Existing institutional arrangements
- 2A. Institutional setting limits producers' capabilities!

	FIP	MSC	ISSF	
Public and private institutions involved	 Local Government Units (LGUs) World-Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)- Philippines 	 PNA government National Fisheries Authority in PNG 	 Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Western and Central Pacific Fishery Commission (WCPFC) 	
Institutional setting	Casa buying systemFisher registration	Sharing systemVessel Day Scheme	 Sharing system FAD-closure Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities 	



Result 2: (horizontal) continued...

Existing institutional supports

2.B. Institutional support improve fishers' capabilities!

Types of institutional	•	Trainings on	•	Observers-on-board	•	Skippers training on
supports		improving fish		programs		FAD design
		quality and fishing	•	Vessel Monitoring	•	observers on board
		practices		System (VMS)		
	•	organising fishers	•	Electronic catch		
	•	seminars on values		documentation		
		formation and				
		fishery				
		management				



Results: Upgrading of fishers

CASE 1: FIPs

- LONG-TERM GOALS to secure long-term income, to improve fishers' livelihoods, to improve fish stocks
- UPGRADING
- ➤ Short-term improvement: 10 out of 43 fishers change the practices. They fish by considering both quality and quantity.
- "('...when I catch a single 40 kilos tuna, I do the proper killing and handling of tuna, and I immediately return to sell the tuna at higher value')
- Other fishers didn't upgrade (fishing based on quantity) due to food security issues, to recover costs of fishing operation, incentive is stocked at local traders
- Long-term: Forming fishers' association



Results: Upgrading (continued...)

CASE 2: MSC

- LONG-TERM GOALS to have sustainable long-term income, to minimise business risks
- UPGRADING
- ➤ Short-term improvement: catching not only based on volume (quantity) but also based on quality, Use of double net separators to separate MSC- and non-MSC fish
- Majority didn't comply due to high risks, high costs, unquestionable incentives, there is a premium but the costs is also high
- ➤ Long-term improvement: convert the fishing techniques from FAD- to free-school fishing, joint venture with processors



Results: Upgrading (continued...)

Case 3: ISSF

- LONG-TERM GOALS to sustain long-term income, to minimise business risks, to improve fish stocks
- UPGRADING
- Short-term improvement: majority maintain their old practice due to high costs of participation, incentive is only for brands and marketers
- ➤ Long-term improvement: only one Filipino fishing company are able to comply with ISSF coordination instrument
- Joint venture with ISSF processors



Conclusions

- The vertical and horizontal actors influence the capabilities of fishers, which ultimately determine fishers' upgrading strategies
- The private incentive mechanisms deliver different upgrading strategies such as:
- a. short-term upgrading: improvement in product, process, and volume
- b. long-term upgrading: 'horizontal contractualisation' (forming fisher association for FIPs)

'vertical contractualisation' (joint ventures of fishing companies and processors for MSC)



Conclusions (continued...)

The incentive offered by private based incentive mechanisms still fails to reach a lot of fishers.



Future work

Quantitative analysis

- Short term decision making of fishers
- Long term decision making of fishers
- Design of new or improved incentive mechanisms based on ex ante modelling



MSC Fieldwork photos











FIP Fieldwork photos









ISSF Fieldwork photos











Thank you!

For more information, please contact:

frazen.tolentino@wur.nl

Or visit us at: www.besttuna.org



